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INTRODUCTION
“For 217 years, through boom and bust, insurgency, civil war, and
terrorist attack, this Court . . . has carefully and prudentially
administered the Writ of Habeas Corpus to secure the rights of the
1
individual against overreaching by the executive.” These words were
written by Chief Judge Young of the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts when he recommended that the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit reverse the removal order entered
against Frank Enwonwu, due to the likelihood that he would be
2
tortured upon return to his native Nigeria.
Despite this
recommendation, the circuit court upheld the order to remove
3
Enwonwu.
Due to legislative changes to the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) in recent years, a considerable risk exists with
the current scheme for judicial review of alien removal orders that
individuals, such as Enwonwu, will be ordered removed to countries
where they face a threat of torture, persecution, and other forms of
4
mistreatment. Most notably, the REAL ID Act of 2005 strips certain
5
classes of aliens of the ability to seek habeas review. Since the Act’s
passage, federal courts have avoided finding that it violates the
6
Suspension Clause of the Constitution. Instead, courts have found
the Act to provide an “adequate and effective” substitute for the writ
7
of habeas corpus and, therefore, have concluded that the Act is not
8
in violation of the Suspension Clause. These decisions have largely
been based on the circuit courts’ own interpretations of the writ,
since historically there has been little discussion of the writ by the
9
Supreme Court.

1. Enwonwu v. Chertoff, 376 F. Supp. 2d 42, 42–43 (D. Mass. 2005).
2. Id. at 85.
3. Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 232 F. App’x 11, 13 (1st Cir. 2007).
4. See Enwonwu, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 72 (finding that Enwonwu had sufficiently
demonstrated that he would face a “danger of violent retribution” if he were to
return to Nigeria).
5. See infra Part I.D (summarizing the provisions of the REAL ID Act).
6. See infra Part I.D (discussing courts’ responses to the passage of the REAL ID
Act).
7. See infra note 79 and accompanying text (examining the circuit courts’
reasoning that the REAL ID Act provides a sufficient substitute for the writ and is
therefore consistent with the Constitution).
8. See infra note 42 and accompanying text (noting the Supreme Court
precedent permitting a suspension of the writ so long as a substitute is provided that
meets certain standards).
9. See infra notes 39–41 and accompanying text (observing the limited Supreme
Court jurisprudence concerning the writ, particularly in the context of executive
detentions).
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This elimination of habeas review has shaped the outcome of many
aliens’ experiences in our justice system, including Frank Enwonwu.
Enwonwu, a native of Nigeria, was arrested in 1986 upon arrival in
the United States after customs officials discovered that he was
10
carrying heroin. After agreeing to serve as a government informant
for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Enwonwu received
11
12
a suspended sentence. He served as an informant for ten months,
13
after which he worked as a nurse assistant and a realtor.
In response to the 1996 amendments to the INA that retroactively
classified aliens convicted of certain felonies as removable to their
14
15
country of origin, Enwonwu was placed in removal proceedings.
The immigration judge (IJ), however, determined that it was “more
likely than not” that Enwonwu would be tortured if he were sent back
16
to Nigeria, given his role as an informant for the U.S. government.
17
the government appealed that
Unbeknownst to Enwonwu,
determination to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), who
overturned the immigration judge’s decision and ordered Enwonwu’s
18
removal in his absence. Immigration and Naturalization Services
19
(INS) arrested him in 2004, and on March 17, 2005, Enwonwu filed
20
a habeas petition with the district court. Despite several days of
21
evidentiary hearings and witness testimony, the district court was
forced to transfer the case to the court of appeals in response to the
22
REAL ID Act, enacted on May 11, 2005, which stripped the district

10. Enwonwu v. Chertoff, 376 F. Supp. 2d 42, 43–44 (D. Mass. 2005).
11. Id. at 47.
12. See id. at 47–49 (describing how Enwonwu provided the DEA with
information concerning the drug trade in Nigeria and also served as a mole within
the Nigerian community in the United States).
13. Id. at 49, 55.
14. See infra Part I.C (describing the changes made to the INA in the 1996
amendments, particularly concerning alien removal orders).
15. Enwonwu, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 49.
16. See id. at 54–55 (relying on expert testimony concerning the
“interrelationship” in Nigeria between drug traffickers, the military, and the
government and on testimony of the DEA agent who had worked with Enwonwu).
17. See id. at 55 (observing that Enwonwu never received the notice of appeal
because it was not properly addressed and that his attorney, who claimed he had not
received it either, never notified him of the appeal).
18. Id. at 56 (rejecting the argument that Enwonwu’s cooperation with DEA
would likely expose him to retribution in Nigeria, relying on the idea that a removal
is not equivalent to torture condoned by a public official).
19. Id. at 55.
20. See id. at 56–57 (arguing that he was procedurally deprived of due process
because of the lack of notice and substantively denied due process because a return
to Nigeria would be a “government-created danger”).
21. Id. at 56–58.
22. Id. at 81 (noting that the court was ready but unable to render a decision).
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courts of jurisdiction over alien removal orders. Nonetheless, in its
order of transfer, the district court recommended that Enwonwu
should be granted relief under the “state-created danger theory”
because Enwonwu’s service as an informant, induced by the
U.S. government, would likely lead to his torture upon return to
24
Nigeria. The court of appeals, however, held that Enwonwu’s claims
concerning a state-created danger and the constitutionality of the
REAL ID Act were not actionable and remanded the case back to the
BIA for further consideration of Enwonwu’s Convention Against
25
Torture (CAT) claim.
On remand, the BIA again ordered
26
Enwonwu’s removal, finding him ineligible for CAT relief.
Enwonwu filed another petition for review in the court of appeals,
but the court still upheld his removal order, finding that the BIA had
27
engaged in a proper de novo review in reversing the IJ’s decision.
Frank Enwonwu now lives in a homeless shelter with his
thirteen-year-old son and can be taken into custody and deported
28
without any notice. Unfortunately, Enwonwu’s story is not unique.
Despite the clear need for more expansive review than what the
circuit courts can currently provide, many individuals have been
prohibited from seeking habeas review since the REAL ID Act’s

23. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on
Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005 (REAL ID Act), Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106,
119 Stat. 231 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
24. See Enwonwu, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 74 (describing the government’s argument
for Enwonwu’s removal as one that “shocks the conscience”).
25. See Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 22, 29, 33, 35 (1st Cir. 2006) (remanding
on Enwonwu’s CAT Claim after finding that, with regards to Enwonwu’s state-created
danger claim, aliens do not have a substantive due process right to not be removed
from the country, and that the REAL ID Act could not be unconstitutional on the
facts presented because Enwonwu received the same level of review at the court of
appeals that he would have received through habeas review).
26. Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 232 F. App’x 11, 13 (1st Cir. 2007).
27. Id. at 16.
28. See Denise Lavoie, Drug Courier Helped in Sting, Feels Stung, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 22,
2008,
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2008/jan/22/news/chi-informant_22
jan22 (reporting that Enwonwu has had to spend five of the past eleven years in
detention although he believed the United States would keep him safe when he
agreed to be an informant); see also AMNESTY 133, AMNESTY INT’L, GROUP 133’S
ELECTRONIC NEWSLETTER FOR MARCH 2008, http://www.amnesty133.org/events/
news/2008/news_3.txt (noting the failed efforts to obtain relief for Enwonwu but
hoping that, because Enwonwu has sole custody of his son, social services might
block the deportation order).
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29

passage. The circuit courts continue to uphold the Act based on the
30
limited jurisprudence available concerning the writ.
31
All of this changed in 2008. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme
Court provided the first extensive interpretation of the meaning and
32
purpose of the Suspension Clause and the writ of habeas corpus.
The majority opinion also set forth an analytical approach for courts
to undertake when determining whether a substitute for the writ is
33
“adequate and effective.”
Based on this new framework, this
Comment argues that the REAL ID Act fails to provide an “adequate
and effective” substitute for the writ because the current level of
review does not allow the courts of appeals to correct the deficiencies
of earlier proceedings.
Part One of this Comment will examine the developments of the
writ of habeas corpus throughout the history of the United States,
beginning with the importance the Founding Fathers placed on the
writ. This section will also examine the recent changes in federal
court review of alien removal orders, beginning with the 1996
legislation and continuing with the REAL ID Act, along with the
federal courts’ responses to those acts. Part Two will then examine
the majority opinion in Boumediene v. Bush, addressing the meaning
and purpose that Justice Kennedy attached to the writ of habeas
corpus and the analytical approach he set forth to determine if a
substitute is “adequate and effective.” Part Three will then analyze
whether the current system for review of alien removal orders
comports with the guidelines set forth by Justice Kennedy in
Boumediene.
This section will draw comparisons between the
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) that the Court
examined in Boumediene and the immigration hearings concerning
alien removal orders. This section will then contrast the level of
review provided to courts of appeals when reviewing alien removal
orders with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia’s level
of review over the CSRTs’ decisions. Finally, this section will examine
29. Ruiz-Almanzar v. Ridge, 485 F.3d 193, 196 n. 7 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining
how district courts were required upon passage of the REAL ID Act to transfer
pending habeas petitions for review of removal orders to the circuit courts).
30. See infra notes 39–41 and accompanying text (observing the limited Supreme
Court jurisprudence concerning the writ, particularly in the context of executive
detentions).
31. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
32. See infra Part II.B (describing the analytical approach set forth by the Court in
Boumediene to determine the quality and sufficiency of a substitute for the writ);
infra notes 38, 40-41, 140 and accompanying text (recounting the imprecise and
vague treatment of the writ by federal appellate courts and the Supreme Court
before Boumediene).
33. Id.
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the courts of appeals’ decisions since the passage of the REAL ID Act
to determine whether the current system provides for adequate
review in light of Boumediene. Part Four recommends the restoration
of the right of aliens to seek habeas review of their removal orders
due to the deficiencies in the earlier proceedings and the lack of
“adequate and effective” review in the courts of appeals.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Historical Development of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
The Founding Fathers placed considerable importance on the writ
of habeas corpus when drafting the Suspension Clause of the
34
Constitution, which provides that the “Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
35
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” As evidence
of its importance, the writ was one of the few individual rights set
36
forth in the Constitution prior to the Bill of Rights.
Alexander
Hamilton described the writ as a “bulwark” against arbitrary
37
prosecutions and punishments.
Despite the significance of the writ, courts have struggled in
38
defining its exact scope and purpose. Early on, the Supreme Court
interpreted the writ as being in “the nature of a writ of error” with the
34. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After INS v. St. Cyr,
33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555, 564–66 (2002) (noting that the Framers
understood the “importance of habeas corpus as a security for physical liberty”).
While there is not considerable information concerning the reason why the final
version of the Clause was used over others, it is clear that the limitation on
Congress’s power to suspend the writ was uncontroversial. Id. at 566. In fact, three
state delegations at the Constitutional Convention dissented from the final vote on
the Clause because they did not feel that Congress should ever be able to suspend the
writ. Id.; see also 8 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 104.04(2)(a) (Matthew Bender & Co. 2008) (“The right to habeas corpus is rooted
in the U.S. Constitution’s Suspension Clause. It has a pre-eminent role in our
constitutional system; its scope, flexibility, and capacity to reach all manner of illegal
detentions have been emphasized and jealously guarded.”).
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
36. Neuman, supra note 34, at 567.
37. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 453 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005)
(quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND *438
(1765)).
38. See Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial
Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1469 (1997) (finding that
both the litigation and history of habeas corpus “suggest[s] that precision in defining
the scope of [the writ] will be unattainable”); cf. Jill M. Pfenning, Inadequate and
Ineffective: Congress Suspends the Writ of Habeas Corpus for Noncitizens Challenging
Removal Orders by Failing to Provide a Way to Introduce Evidence, 31 VT. L. REV. 735, 741
(2007) (discussing the “debate” as to the scope of habeas review in the context of an
alien challenging a removal order and finding that it was generally understood as a
means of challenging the “legality of the detention”).
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purpose of examining the legality of the detention. Later opinions
by federal courts limited the scope of the writ to examining due
process violations or “violation[s] of the Constitution or laws or
40
treaties of the United States.” Despite the frequency with which the
federal courts have addressed the writ, any discussion of its scope and
41
The Supreme Court has made clear,
purpose has been limited.
however, that Congress can suspend the writ so long as it substitutes
another form of review that is “neither inadequate nor ineffective to
42
test the legality of a person’s detention.” In addition, the limited
discussion of the writ has largely dealt with its use in the context of
state court convictions with little attention directed at habeas review
43
of executive detentions. While the focus on state court convictions
is important, the primary historical purpose of the writ was to protect
44
against unlawful executive detentions.
B. Importance of the Writ in Immigration Law
The writ of habeas corpus has “played a vital role” in immigration
45
law as a means for aliens to challenge their removal orders.
39. See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830) (discussing the writ’s
history in England).
40. 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 21 (4th ed. 2001) (citation omitted). Hertz and Liebman outline the
various enumerations the Supreme Court gave to the writ, including language that
would end up being used in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Id.
41. See id. at 6–9, 18–23 (explaining that, throughout the history of the writ in the
United States, the Supreme Court has often used “one- or two-word labels,” such as a
“civil remedy” and a “clearly appellate” process, which have sometimes been
inconsistent and controversial when describing the scope of the writ, while also using
“broad rhetoric” to describe the purpose of the writ, ranging from proclaiming the
writ to be “in the nature of a writ of error, to examine the legality of the
commitment” to a “remedy whose most basic traditions and purposes are to avoid a
grievous wrong—holding a person in custody in violation of the Constitution”
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
42. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977); see United States v. Hayman, 342
U.S. 205, 223 (1952) (discussing the adequacy and effectiveness of an alternative to
habeas corpus).
43. See Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996
Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1963, 1965 (2000) (critiquing the emphasis on
state court convictions review, where “[t]he primary focus has been federalism, not
separation of powers”).
44. See id. (explaining that the writ was meant to protect against both “executive
detention without legal authority and executive detention in violation of legal
restrictions”).
45. See 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 40, at 1769 (acknowledging the Supreme
Court’s view that “[b]efore and after the enactment in 1875 of the first statute
regulating immigration . . . federal habeas corpus jurisdiction was regularly invoked
on behalf of noncitizens, particularly in the immigration context” (quoting INS v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305-06 (2001))). Moreover, “[u]ntil the enactment of the 1952
Immigration and Nationality Act, the sole means by which an alien could test the
legality of his or her deportation order was by bringing a habeas corpus action in
district court.” Id.; see GORDON ET AL., supra note 34, § 104.04(2)(a) (“[H]abeas
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Even prior to receiving statutory authority from Congress, federal
courts consistently heard habeas petitions from aliens concerning
46
In 1953, the
both constitutional and non-constitutional claims.
47
Supreme Court in Heikkila v. Barber recognized the constitutional
right of aliens to petition the federal courts for review of immigration
48
However, the Court clarified that the scope of such
decisions.
review was limited to due process requirements, which is “very
different from applying a statutory standard of review, [such as]
deciding on ‘the whole record’ whether there is substantial evidence
49
to support administrative findings of fact.”
The 1961 amendments to the INA provided the next major
development in review of alien removal orders by stipulating that the
courts of appeals had “sole and exclusive” authority to review removal
50
orders. While review was typically limited to the courts of appeals,
aliens had numerous assurances that they would receive adequate
51
review. Additionally, aliens subject to removal and simultaneously
detained were still allowed to petition a district court for habeas
52
review, rather than turning to the courts of appeals on direct review.
Habeas review was also available for “unusual cases,” where a removal
corpus is the historic—and most fundamental—basis for judicial review of
immigration orders.”).
The 1996 legislation consolidated “exclusion” and
“deportation” into one category entitled “removal”; for the purposes of this
Comment, the term removal will be used. See Pfenning, supra note 38, at 743
(explaining the changes made in the 1996 legislation).
46. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 34, § 104.04(2)(b) (noting that despite the
1891 and 1917 Immigration Acts, which were intended to prohibit judicial review of
aliens’ petitions, courts continued to hear such claims, indicating that the right to
such review was constitutionally based); see also Neuman, supra note 43, at 1966
(observing that prior to congressional regulation of immigration, federal courts
utilized the writ in examining the lawfulness of removing various groups of aliens,
including enemy aliens and those aliens accused of committing a crime).
47. 345 U.S. 229 (1953).
48. Id. at 237; see also David M. McConnell, Judicial Review Under the Immigration
and Nationality Act: Habeas Corpus and the Coming of REAL ID (1996–2005), 51 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 75, 79 (2006–07) (summarizing the Supreme Court’s holding that
habeas review was the sole means of review for aliens because the Immigration Act of
1917 precluded any other form of review of immigration decisions).
49. Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 236.
50. Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5, 75 Stat. 650, 651-53 (repealed
1996); see also McConnell, supra note 48, at 80-81 (describing the judicial review
scheme set up by the 1961 INA as “more closely resembling” the review found in the
Administrative Procedure Act than habeas review, which was narrower in scope
under the Heikkila decision).
51. See McConnell, supra note 48, at 81 (summarizing the provisions of the 1961
INA, including the ability of aliens to file for review up to ninety days after the final
removal order was entered and the authority of the courts of appeals to review the
administrative record, discretionary decisions, and factual determinations under
varying levels of review).
52. See id. at 81-82, 82 n.37 (quoting the INA provision stating that “any alien
held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation may obtain judicial review
thereof by habeas corpus proceedings” (citation omitted)).
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order was necessitated by various circumstances, such as ineffective
53
assistance of counsel. Aliens were even allowed to file a second
54
habeas petition in certain situations. This system of judicial review
55
remained in place until Congress took action in 1996.
C. 1996 Amendments to the INA and the Supreme Court’s
Response in INS v. St. Cyr
Congress made drastic changes to the procedure for judicial review
56
of alien removal orders in two different 1996 acts.
Initially, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) repealed
section 106(a)(10) of the INA, which had allowed habeas review for
57
deportable aliens being detained. AEDPA also added a provision to
the INA, which prohibited any judicial review over deportations of
58
aliens convicted of certain crimes.
Within the same year, Congress again altered judicial review of
removal orders in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
59
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which repealed all of section 106 of the
INA and replaced it with section 242, part of which applied
60
retroactively. This new section provided that aliens only had thirty
days to petition for review and that review of all removal orders would
take place in the court of appeals in the circuit in which the IJ had
53. See Nancy Morawetz, Back to Back to the Future? Lessons Learned from Litigation
Over the 1996 Restrictions on Judicial Review, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 113, 117 (2006-07)
(finding several situations where the circuit courts found habeas review available,
including: ineffective assistance of counsel, an emergency stay of deportation while
an appeal was pending, and abuse of discretion by the agency).
54. See id. (noting the availability of second habeas petitions when information
became available that was not presented at the earlier proceeding or if earlier
proceedings provided a remedy that was “inadequate or ineffective”).
55. See Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of
Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 961 (1998) (explaining that the 104th Congress passed
new legislation motivated by a frustration with what it perceived as “enforcement
inefficiencies” with the INS).
56. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.); see also Neuman, supra note 55, at 961
(indicating that the 1996 acts would, “if taken literally, create unprecedented
restrictions on the availability of habeas corpus to aliens being removed from the
United States”).
57. AEDPA § 401(e).
58. Id. § 401(a).
59. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
60. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 34, § 104.04(3)(a) (noting that section 242(g)
of IIRIRA, which limited judicial review of certain immigration issues, was “expressly
made to apply to ‘past, pending or future exclusion, deportation, or removal
proceedings under [the] Act’” (citation omitted)).
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61

issued the removal order. IIRIRA also further limited the scope of
judicial review by providing that aliens convicted of serious criminal
62
offenses would have no review of their removal order.
Numerous
issues
immediately
arose
concerning
the
constitutionality of these provisions with regard to the Suspension
63
64
Clause, resulting in a surge of litigation. The main issue that arose
from this litigation centered on the availability of judicial review for
65
those aliens convicted of criminal offenses. While the Acts made
clear that direct review to the courts of appeals was unavailable for
aliens convicted of certain crimes, it was unclear whether Congress
had intended to eliminate habeas review as well since there was no
66
explicit reference to the writ.
In resolving that issue in INS v.
67
St. Cyr, the Supreme Court held that habeas review by the federal
district courts was still available because Congress had not provided a
“clear, unambiguous, and express statement of [its] intent” to repeal
68
habeas review. The Court in St. Cyr, however, did not undertake to
69
examine the scope of habeas review in making its decision.
In response to the Supreme Court’s indication of what was required
61. IIRIRA § 306(a)(2).
62. Id. § 309(c)(4)(G); see also McConnell, supra note 48, at 86-87 (explaining
that prior to these acts, “aliens could file review petitions in the courts of appeals and
detained aliens could challenge their deportation orders in habeas corpus
proceedings”). The IIRIRA provision provided a similar list to the provisions in
AEDPA of offenses that qualified as a serious criminal act, thus barring review.
Id. at 87. The provision included such crimes as “aggravated felonies, controlled
substance and firearms offenses, multiple crimes involving moral turpitude, and
other miscellaneous offenses.” Id.
63. See generally Neuman, supra note 55, at 966-67 (describing the issues that arose
in response to the 1996 acts, including the extent to which the bar to review of a
deportation resulting from criminal conduct permitted the courts to review whether
the conduct truly warranted deportation).
64. See McConnell, supra note 48, at 86, 88 (noting that despite Congress’s desire
to “streamline and expedite” judicial review of aliens’ claims, considerable litigation
arose in response to the 1996 acts).
65. See Neuman, supra note 43, at 1986-87 (observing that IIRIRA presented an
issue as to whether the “rule [was] explicit enough to preclude habeas
jurisdiction, . . . and potentially whether such preclusion [was] constitutional”).
66. See McConnell, supra note 48, at 87, 89 (reporting on the circuit court split
that developed over whether habeas review was available to criminal aliens in light of
AEDPA and IIRIRA). The Government maintained the position that habeas review
was no longer available. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 34, § 104.04(3)(a) (noting
that, because the 1996 acts did not “explicitly repeal[] or even address[] the
traditional habeas corpus review provided by statute,” the Government argued it was
repealed implicitly).
67. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
68. See id. at 314 (finding that, if the Court were to rule otherwise, there would be
no forum for review, which would raise Suspension Clause concerns and, therefore,
the Court would read the acts to be constitutional).
69. See id. at 301 n.13 (explaining that “[t]he fact that th[e] Court would be
required to answer the difficult question of what the Suspension Clause protects is in
and of itself a reason” to find habeas review still available after the 1996 acts).
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to effectuate a repeal of habeas review, Congress acted again in 2005
70
to make its intent to repeal habeas review perfectly clear.
D. The REAL ID Act Suspends Habeas Review of Alien Removal Orders
In the REAL ID Act of 2005, Congress unambiguously eliminated
71
habeas review of alien removal orders. Congress admitted that the
72
Act was a direct response to the Supreme Court’s decision in St. Cyr.
Congress believed the decision had created “anomalies” in the
73
judicial review scheme for alien removal orders and was inconsistent
74
with the purpose of the 1996 acts.
In the cases that have arisen since the REAL ID Act, review of alien
removal orders is only available in the courts of appeals and is limited
75
to constitutional and legal claims. In addition, the REAL ID Act
76
maintains a thirty-day deadline for filing petitions for review, limits
77
courts of appeals’ review to the administrative record, and does not
78
allow the courts to hear new evidence. Despite the REAL ID Act’s
70. See McConnell, supra note 48, at 105 (explaining that the congressional
repeal of habeas review of removal orders in the REAL ID Act was a direct response
to the Supreme Court’s decision in St. Cyr and other decisions in which the Court
had not found congressional intent to be sufficiently explicit and unambiguous to
justify a finding that habeas review was completely barred).
71. Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(a)(1)(B)(5), 119 Stat. 231 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see McConnell, supra note 48, at 105 (suggesting that
congressional intent to repeal habeas review could not have been clearer). Congress
did attempt to ensure that there were no Suspension Clause concerns by adding a
section stating that “[n]othing [in this Act] shall be construed as precluding review
of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed
with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.” REAL ID Act
§ 106(a)(1)(A)(iii).
72. H.R. REP. NO. 109–72, at 173 (2005) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 240.
73. See id. at 174 (arguing that St. Cyr gave criminal aliens more review than noncriminal aliens and created confusion as to which court should review immigration
cases). Congress had been very critical of the system that resulted from the Supreme
Court’s decision in St. Cyr. See Gerald L. Neuman, On the Adequacy of Direct Review
After the REAL ID Act of 2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133, 136 n.11 (2006-07)
(acknowledging Congress’s concern that lawyers and courts would have difficulty
litigating in such a system).
74. See id. at 172 (admitting that the purpose of the 1996 acts was to limit judicial
review of alien removal orders, albeit in an effort to streamline the process).
75. Id. at 174 (noting that habeas review is not intended to address nonconstitutional discretionary or factual issues).
76. See Morawetz, supra note 53, at 126 (contending that, while the thirty-day
limit also existed with the 1996 acts, constitutional issues were avoided because the
petition for review was only the primary, but not the sole, means of review).
77. See id. at 128 (noting that previously habeas review had served as a safety net
for situations where factual issues needed to be addressed that were not included in
the administrative record).
78. See Neuman, supra note 71, at 145 (maintaining that the adequacy of the
review depends on the ability of the court to “make necessary inquiries”). Since the
1996 legislation, the courts of appeals are also not authorized to remand to the
administrative agencies for more evidence gathering. See id. at 146.
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limitations on review, courts of appeals have upheld the Act as
constitutional by finding that it provides an “adequate and effective”
79
substitute for the writ through direct review to the courts of appeals.
E. Executive Attempts to Limit Review at the Administrative Level
As Congress attempted to limit review of alien removal orders, the
executive branch instituted streamlining procedures at the BIA, an
“administrative tribunal” of the Department of Justice (DOJ) that
80
hears appeals from the immigration courts. These measures were
81
implemented to resolve the tremendous backlog of appeals.
Beginning in 1999, the DOJ instituted changes in the appeals
procedure, one of which authorized the Chairman of the BIA to
define categories of cases that could appropriately be heard by a
82
single board member instead of the usual three-member panel.
The streamlining continued in 2002 when the Chairman added two
more large categories to those appeals that could be decided by a
83
single board member. The Chairman continued adding categories
until essentially all appeals concerning removal could be heard by a
single board member; hearings by three-member panels have become
84
the exception, not the rule. These single board members are also
authorized to affirm decisions made by an IJ without issuing an
85
The streamlining measures also limit the scope of the
opinion.
86
BIA’s review in examining factual findings of the IJs. Additionally,
79. See, e.g., Ruiz-Martinez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 102, 114 (2d Cir. 2008)
(“[O]ther Circuits, with which [this court] now join[s], have determined that the
provision of the REAL ID Act at issue here is not unconstitutional because
‘it provides, through review by a federal court of appeals, an adequate and effective
remedy to test the legality of an alien’s detention.’” (citation omitted)). In this
decision, the Second Circuit joined the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in
holding that the REAL ID Act was constitutional. See id. (citing Mohammed v.
Gonzales, 477 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 2007); Puri v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1038, 1041
(9th Cir. 2006); Alexandre v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 1204, 1206 (11th Cir. 2006)).
80. See generally John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in
the Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 13, 17 n.16
(2006-07) (listing the various decisions that the BIA reviews in addition to alien
removal orders).
81. See id. at 17-18, 18 n.18 (noting the increase in the 1990s of appeals of IJ
decisions to the BIA with the total number of appeals before the BIA reaching almost
30,000 in 2000, compared to less than 3000 in 1984 (citation omitted)).
82. Id. at 18.
83. See id. at 19 (allowing single board members to hear appeals “involving claims
for asylum, withholding, and CAT relief,” in addition to “cases involving claims for
suspension of deportation or cancellation of removal”).
84. Id. at 19.
85. Id. at 18. Such decisions lacking a written opinion are called affirmances
without opinions (“AWOs”). Id.
86. See id. at 19 (explaining that the BIA, which used to have de novo review over
factual findings, must now defer to factual findings of the IJ “unless they are clearly
erroneous,” and it can no longer engage in any fact finding itself).
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the executive branch reduced the number of members on the BIA
87
from twenty-three to eleven.
While the aforementioned changes were implemented to reduce
the BIA’s backlog, these measures have led to a 970 percent increase
in the number of appeals to the federal courts; any reduction in the
88
backlog at the BIA has merely been transferred to the federal courts.
The resulting increase in appeals has turned the courts of appeals
89
into a “major focal point for immigration litigation,” despite the
90
limited review available to aliens in these courts. Regardless of the
narrow scope of review at both the BIA and the courts of appeals, the
courts of appeals have upheld the REAL ID Act’s repeal of habeas
91
review, finding the current level of review “adequate and effective.”
II. BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH SETS FORTH THE SUPREME COURT’S
APPROACH TO DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The Supreme Court expanded its explanation of the writ of habeas
92
corpus in its 2008 decision Boumediene v. Bush. The majority opinion
by Justice Kennedy extended the writ of habeas corpus to the
93
detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
More importantly, however, the

87. Id. While the purpose of decreasing the number of members on the BIA was
to encourage “cohesiveness and collegiality,” id., it seems “perverse” to do so when
the BIA was facing such a tremendous backlog. Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls:
How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the Administrative Process Increase Immigration
Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 44 n.20 (2006-07). Benson also
notes that the members removed from the BIA were those most likely to dissent or
“write concurring opinions that suggested alternative legal analysis.” Id. At the time
this article went to print, the BIA has been authorized to increase its size to fifteen
board members, although vacancies still exist. United States Department of Justice,
Executive Office for Immigration Review, Board of Immigration Appeals,
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited July 29, 2009).
88. See Benson, supra note 87, at 47 (describing the streamlining as having
created an “explosion” of work in the federal courts). While it remains unclear what
exactly motivated the increase in appeals to the circuit courts, whether it be a lack of
faith in the BIA’s procedure or some other factor, the link between those procedural
changes and the surge in litigation in the courts of appeals is clear. Id.
89. See Palmer, supra note 80, at 35 (noting the indisputable link between the
procedural changes at the BIA and the resulting surge in litigation in the courts of
appeals).
90. See supra Parts I.C-D (describing the legislative changes to judicial review of
alien removal orders).
91. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (acknowledging the circuit courts
that have upheld the REAL ID Act).
92. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
93. Id. at 2262 (holding that “the Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.
If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to the detainees now before us,
Congress must act in accordance with the requirements of the Suspension Clause.”).
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Supreme Court enunciated what it had failed to explain in St. Cyr.
For the first time, the Supreme Court set forth its interpretation of
the meaning and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus and the
95
analysis to undertake in determining its scope.
A. Background and Summary of Boumediene v. Bush
Boumediene involved a several-year struggle for the detainees at
Guantanamo to secure the right to habeas review of their Combatant
Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) hearings, which had determined that
96
they were enemy combatants. Though the Military Commissions Act
97
of 2006 (MCA) eliminated habeas review of the CSRT hearings, the
Government argued that the Suspension Clause had not been
violated because the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) created a
constitutionally sufficient substitute for the writ by allowing direct
98
review by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
A majority of the Supreme Court disagreed and held that the MCA
was an unconstitutional suspension of the writ because direct review
99
was not a constitutionally sufficient substitute.

94. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (noting that the Court in St. Cyr did
not attempt to define the scope of habeas review).
95. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262-74 (discussing whether Congress had
provided an adequate substitute for the writ since it had removed habeas review in
the Military Commissions Act (MCA)).
96. See id. at 2240-42 (outlining the procedural history of the case). See generally
Carrie Newton Lyons et al., International Legal Developments in Review: 2007, Public
International Law, National Security: Supreme Court Again to Consider Guantanamo
Detainees, 42 INT’L LAW. 811, 812 (2008) (noting that Congress passed the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) in response to Rasul v. Bush, which extended habeas
protections to aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay (citations omitted)). “[I]n June
2006, the Supreme Court responded again in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, holding that the
DTA did not strip federal courts of jurisdiction over pending habeas petitions from
detainees.” Id. (citation omitted). “As a response, Congress and the executive
branch passed the [MCA],” which explicitly stripped the federal courts of the
authority to hear habeas claims. Id. (citation omitted).
97. Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2635 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
98. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262. The DTA states that:
The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit on any claims with respect to an [enemy combatant] . . .
shall be limited to the consideration of: (i) whether the status determination
of the [CSRT] . . . was consistent with the standards and procedures
specified by the Secretary of Defense . . . and (ii) to the extent the
Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable, whether the use of
such standards and procedures to make the determination is consistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(2)(C), 119 Stat.
2739 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 1, 5, 10, 15, 16, 28, 37, 41, 42, and
50 U.S.C.).
99. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2274.
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B. The Analytical Approach Established in Boumediene to Determine
What Constitutes an “Adequate and Effective” Substitute
for the Writ of Habeas Corpus
Despite finding that a constitutionally sufficient substitute had not
been provided, the majority in Boumediene did not set forth a clear
test for determining when a substitute for the writ would be
100
Instead, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
sufficient.
explained that the writ is an “adaptable remedy” whose exact scope
101
will change depending on the circumstances.
Due to this
adaptability, Kennedy proffered only two requirements that a
substitute for the writ must provide: a “meaningful opportunity” for
any detained person to “demonstrate that he is being held pursuant
102
to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation of [the] law’” and
the ability of a reviewing court to order the release of the detained
103
person.
Beyond those requirements, the scope of habeas review depends
104
To illustrate this point,
on the nature of the earlier proceedings.
Justice Kennedy compared the writ in the context of review of
executive detentions to its use in reviewing state court criminal
105
convictions.
In examining the common law history of the writ,
Kennedy noted that “pretrial and noncriminal detention[s]”
106
appeared to receive the most extensive habeas review. As Kennedy
explained:
A criminal conviction in the usual course occurs after a judicial
hearing before a tribunal disinterested in the outcome and
100. See id. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
“replac[ing] a review system designed by the people’s representatives with a set of
shapeless procedures to be defined by federal courts at some future date”).
101. See id. at 2266-67 (majority opinion) (explaining why the majority opinion
did not provide a “comprehensive summary of the requisites for an adequate
substitute for habeas corpus”). This explanation of the writ as adaptable is consistent
with prior Supreme Court decisions. See Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345,
349–50 (1973). For instance, in Jones v. Cunningham, the Court stated that the writ
“is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy.” 371 U.S. 236,
243 (1963). In Harris v. Nelson, the Court explained that, due to the nature of the
writ, it must be “administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that
miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.” See 394 U.S. 286,
291 (1969) (describing that the purpose of the writ, in protecting against all illegal
detention, requires it to be able “to cut through barriers of form and procedural
mazes”).
102. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2266 (citation omitted).
103. Id. (noting, however, that the release of an individual does not have to be the
“exclusive remedy[,]” nor is it always the most appropriate one).
104. Id. at 2268.
105. Id. at 2267–69.
106. See id. at 2267 (explaining that the more extensive habeas review was due to
“little or no previous judicial review of the cause for detention”).
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committed to procedures designed to ensure its own
independence. These dynamics are not inherent in executive
detention orders . . . . In this context the need for habeas corpus is
107
more urgent.

In light of this difference in the scope of review, it was particularly
important to the Boumediene majority that, even in the context of state
court convictions, there were clear limits on the ability to
108
circumscribe habeas review. For instance, in Swain v. Pressley and
109
United States v. Hayman, the Court’s leading cases concerning
habeas substitutes for state court convictions, the majorities stressed
that the substitutes were not “intended to circumscribe habeas
110
review.”
Additionally, in upholding the substitutes, the Court in
both cases relied heavily on the existence of a savings clause in each
statute that permitted habeas review if the substitute proved
111
inadequate.
The majority in Boumediene also established that a due process
analysis does not end the inquiry into the constitutionality of the
112
substitute.
As the Court noted, in the context of state court
convictions, both Swain and Hayman established that the writ is
relevant even when a person is detained after a criminal trial that was
113
conducted in accordance with the Bill of Rights. In explaining the
need to go beyond a due process analysis, Kennedy described habeas
review as a “collateral process” that is not “subordinat[e]” to the
114
original proceeding.
Beyond these general principles, the majority made clear that the
sufficiency of any substitute for the writ will be determined on a

107. Id. at 2269.
108. 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
109. 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
110. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2264-66 (finding that the purpose and effect of
the statutes involved in both cases was intended only to expedite post conviction
review, not to “frustrate” it).
111. Id. at 2265-66.
112. See id. at 2270 (explaining that “[e]ven when the procedures authorizing
detention are structurally sound, the Suspension Clause remains applicable and the
writ relevant”); see also Neuman, supra note 43, at 1965 (arguing that the “writ [is] not
directed solely against detention that violates constitutional rights”). Professor
Neuman supports the argument that the writ goes beyond a constitutional protection
by pointing out that “the United States inherited habeas corpus from the English
legal system, which had no separate category of constitutional error.” Id.
113. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2270.
114. See id. (“Habeas corpus is a collateral process that exists . . . to ‘cut through all
forms and go to the very tissue of the structure. It comes in from the outside, not in
subordination to the proceedings, and although every form may have been preserved
[sic] opens the inquiry whether they have been more than an empty shell.’” (quoting
Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
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115

case-by-case analysis.
The initial proceedings must first be
examined in order to identify any potential issues or problems that
116
arise based on both their structure and overall nature. The analysis
then turns to the reviewing court to determine whether the substitute
provides adequate review given any deficiencies in the previous
117
hearings.
C. Application of Boumediene’s New Analytical Approach
to the Detainees at Guantanamo
After setting forth this approach to determining whether a
substitute satisfies the Suspension Clause, the majority found that, in
118
light of the proceedings and nature of the CSRTs, the DTA did not
119
In examining the
provide an “adequate and effective” substitute.
CSRTs, the Court was especially concerned with the “considerable
risk of error” in the factual findings, even when the parties fully
120
adhered to proper procedures.
Considering that a mistake may
lead to the detention of an innocent person for an indefinite period
of time, the high risk of error provoked heightened concern for the
121
constitutionality of the substitute.
Therefore, the Court held that,
in order “to function as an effective and proper remedy,” the
122
reviewing court must be able to correct any factual errors.
This would include some ability “to assess the sufficiency of the
Government’s evidence against the detainee” and the ability to
introduce and consider exculpatory evidence not admitted at the
123
CSRT hearing.
115. Id. at 2266, 2270.
116. See id. at 2266-68 (describing the difference in the scope of review depending
on whether the detention is based on a criminal conviction emanating from a court
or an executive detention).
117. See id. at 2269-74 (determining whether the DTA provides adequate review in
light of the circumstances at the CSRTs).
118. Id. at 2269 (noting numerous deficiencies including the detainee’s difficulty
in rebutting the Government’s claim that he is an enemy combatant, the “limited
means to find or present evidence,” and the lack of counsel).
119. Id. at 2272-74 (finding that the court of appeals cannot order the detainee
released even if it finds that detention is not justified). The court is only allowed to
examine the standards and procedures of the military commission and cannot
engage in any fact finding nor allow the detainee to present exculpatory evidence
that was not available during the earlier proceedings. Id.
120. Id. at 2270.
121. Id. at 2270-71; cf. id. at 2279 (Souter, J., concurring) (criticizing the
dissenting Justices for not appreciating the length of time the detainees had been at
Guantanamo, which, for some, had already reached six years).
122. Id. at 2270 (majority opinion) (noting that habeas petitioners in federal
courts traditionally have been able to submit additional evidence to the reviewing
court, even in the state court conviction context).
123. Id.
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It was, therefore, not difficult for the majority to find the DTA an
124
inadequate substitute for the writ. First, under the DTA, the court
of appeals did not have the power to order the release of the
125
126
detainee, nor could it make the necessary factual findings.
127
Additionally, unlike the statutes in both Swain and Hayman, neither
the DTA nor the MCA contained a savings clause to permit habeas
review should the “alternative process prove[] inadequate or
128
ineffective.”
In further contrast to the statutes in Swain and
129
Hayman, which were created to streamline judicial review, the DTA
and MCA were intended to limit judicial review of the detainee’s
130
petitions.
Based on these characteristics of the judicial review
scheme set up in the DTA, the Court found that the DTA did not
provide an adequate substitute, and the MCA consequently was an
131
unconstitutional suspension of the writ.
D. Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissent Arguing for a Due Process Analysis
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts approached his analysis of the
MCA from an opposing perspective, arguing that the Court cannot
reach its conclusion without first determining whether the CSRTs
132
comport with the Due Process Clause.
This approach, however,
133
stems from a drastically different understanding of the writ.
124. Id. at 2274.
125. Id. at 2271.
126. Id. at 2271-74 (observing that the Court of Appeals was confined to reviewing
the record from the CSRT and could not provide the detainees with an opportunity
to introduce new exculpatory evidence). While the detainee could request a new
CSRT hearing if exculpatory material became available after the initial hearing, the
Court found this insufficient to allow new evidence introduced because the Deputy
Secretary of Defense has complete discretion in granting a new hearing, and the
detainee has no opportunity to challenge the denial of a new hearing. Id. at 2273.
127. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (observing that the statutes
involved in both cases contained a savings clause that permitted habeas review if
direct review proved inadequate or ineffective).
128. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2265-66.
129. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (describing how both statutes were
intended to expedite judicial review).
130. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2265.
131. See id. at 2275-76 (explaining that the Court was only holding
unconstitutional section 7 of the MCA, which barred habeas review for the detainees;
the DTA and the CSRT process would still remain intact, and the only difference in
the judicial review scheme would be the opportunity for the detainees to seek habeas
review).
132. See id. at 2281 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Because the majority refuses to
assess whether the CSRTs comport with the Constitution, it ends up razing a system
of collateral review that it admits may in fact satisfy the Due Process Clause and be
‘structurally sound.’”).
133. See generally Neuman, supra note 43, at 1964-65 (explaining that judicial
review in the context of executive detention can be examined from three
overlapping perspectives: “the Article I prohibition against suspension of the writ of
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Roberts found the writ to solely protect an individual’s due process
134
Under Chief Justice Roberts’s narrow
right to a fair hearing.
approach, the CSRTs comported with the rules by which they were
135
bound and provided the detainees a “constitutionally adequate
136
In contrast, the majority
opportunity to contest their detentions.”
based its interpretation of the writ on the Suspension Clause and
137
therefore found the scope of habeas review to be much broader.
The majority found that the purpose of the writ was not only to
ensure fair procedures, but also to provide protections against
138
detentions based on inaccurate determinations.
This approach is
consistent with Supreme Court precedent, which has “consistently
rejected interpretations of the [writ] that would suffocate [it] in
stifling formalisms or hobble its effectiveness with the manacles of
139
arcane and scholastic procedural requirements.”
III. APPLYING BOUMEDIENE’S ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO DETERMINING
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A SUBSTITUTE FOR HABEAS REVIEW
INDICATES THAT THE REAL ID ACT DOES NOT PROVIDE
“ADEQUATE AND EFFECTIVE” REVIEW
Since Boumediene offers the Supreme Court’s first extensive
140
discussion of the Suspension Clause, it necessarily encourages an
habeas corpus, the vesting of judicial power in the federal courts under Article III, or
the Fifth Amendment prohibition against deprivation of liberty without due process
of law”). Professor Neuman, in support of the majority in Boumediene, argues that the
Suspension Clause must drive the analysis of judicial review of executive detentions
and that Article III and the Due Process Clause must be read in light of this
prohibition against suspending the writ of habeas corpus. Id.
134. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Habeas is most
fundamentally a procedural right . . . . The critical threshold question in these cases,
prior to any inquiry about the writ’s scope, is whether the system the political
branches designed protects whatever rights the detainees may possess.”); see also
Benson, supra note 87, at 60 (noting that due process, under current case law, may
not require review of immigration hearings by an Article III court).
135. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2287-89 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting the
rights detainees possess at their CSRT hearings, including the right to examine
witnesses and call witnesses of their own).
136. Id. at 2284.
137. Id. at 2244 (majority opinion).
138. See id. at 2266 (“We do consider it uncontroversial, however, that the
privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to
demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or
interpretation of relevant law.’” (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001))).
139. Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 350 (1973).
140. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2263 (explaining that “[o]ur case law does not
contain extensive discussion of standards defining suspension of the writ or of
circumstances under which suspension has occurred”); see also HERTZ & LIEBMAN,
supra note 40, at 6-7 (noting that the extent of Supreme Court treatment of the writ
was largely limited to “one- to two-word labels”). Justice Kennedy proffered an
explanation for this absence of analysis of the writ as due to the fact that
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examination of other forums where the writ has traditionally been
employed to ensure that the right to habeas review is protected in
141
accordance with the Court’s understanding of the writ.
Considering the extensive legislative changes to judicial review of
142
alien removal orders that have occurred in recent years, the current
system under the REAL ID Act should be reexamined using the
analytical approach introduced by the Supreme Court in
143
Boumediene.
A. Boumediene’s Analytical Approach Should Be Applied to the
REAL ID Act to Determine Its Constitutionality
In light of the similar judicial review scheme that Congress
established for both Guantanamo detentions and alien removal
144
orders, the analysis that the Court established in Boumediene should
be applied to the REAL ID Act’s judicial review scheme for alien
removal orders. Even if differences exist between the two judicial
review procedures, the analytical approach set forth in Boumediene is
still appropriate because the Court indicated that its analysis was not
limited to habeas review for Guantanamo detainees and should
145
extend to other forms of executive detention.
First, the Court
stressed that judicial review is “most pressing” in the context of
executive detentions because, unlike state court convictions, such
detentions are not the result of hearings before “disinterested”
146
tribunals.
Additionally, even in the context of state court
convictions, the Court indicated that it would still apply the analysis

“Congress has taken [care] throughout our Nation’s history to preserve the writ and
its function. Indeed, most of the major legislative enactments pertaining to habeas
corpus have acted not to contract the writ’s protection but to expand it or to hasten
resolution of prisoners’ claims.” Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2263.
141. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.”).
142. See supra Part I.C–D (describing the changes to judicial review of alien
removal orders beginning with the 1996 amendments to the INA and culminating
with the elimination of habeas review in the REAL ID Act of 2005).
143. Cf. Neuman, supra note 43, at 1965 (commenting that the “fundamental
historical purpose” of the writ was to safeguard against unlawful executive detention,
yet noting that the majority of scholarship concerning the writ in recent decades has
been concerned with state court convictions).
144. See supra Parts I.D, II.A (observing that the DTA and MCA established that
the only review available for the Guantanamo detainees would occur in the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, while the REAL ID Act provided that review of
alien removal orders would reside with the relevant court of appeals).
145. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2268-69 (discussing the need for more extensive
review of all executive detentions, not merely those involved at Guantanamo).
146. Id. at 2269.
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set forth in Boumediene.
The Court referenced leading cases
involving judicial review of state court convictions as examples of
appellate schemes that would provide constitutionally sufficient
148
evaluation under the Boumediene analysis.
The implication that
Boumediene’s approach applies to all forms of habeas review is also
indicated by the nature of the analysis itself, which the Court
149
described as an “adaptable remedy.”
Consequently, the judicial review scheme established in the
REAL ID Act ought to be reviewed using the Court’s analysis in
Boumediene in order to determine the Act’s constitutionality under the
Suspension Clause. Under this approach, the hearings at the
administrative level, both before an immigration judge and on appeal
before the Board of Immigration Appeals, must be examined, as the
150
Supreme Court examined the CSRTs in Boumediene, in order to
determine if any issues exist that create concern in the resulting
removal order. The analysis should then turn to the reviewing court
to determine whether it has the ability to correct the deficiencies
151
from the earlier proceedings.
Therefore, as the Court in
152
Boumediene examined the DTA’s scope of review, the analysis in the
context of alien removal orders turns to the courts of appeals, which
have exclusive jurisdiction to review IJ and BIA decisions under the
153
REAL ID Act.
In conducting this analysis, numerous similarities
appear between the review of alien removal orders and the
154
detentions at Guantanamo. These similarities necessitate the same
conclusion with regard to the REAL ID Act that the Court reached in
147. See id. at 2263-69 (applying a similar analysis as that applied to the DTA and
MCA when explaining why the Court upheld the suspension of the writ in Swain v.
Pressley and United States v. Hayman through examining the scope of the review and
purpose of the statute (citations omitted)).
148. See id. at 2264-65 (explaining that the substitute review provided for in both
Swain and Hayman did not intend to limit review, had a much broader jurisdictional
grant than the DTA provided, and maintained a savings clause that permitted habeas
review if the substitute proved “inadequate or ineffective”).
149. See id. at 2267 (noting that the exact scope of the writ depends on the earlier
proceedings and, therefore, will necessarily change depending on the
circumstances).
150. See supra Part II.C (explaining the deficiencies in the CSRT hearings).
151. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (describing that the adequacy of
the reviewing court must be examined in light of the circumstances of the earlier
proceedings).
152. See supra Part II.C (maintaining that the jurisdictional grant to the court of
appeals was insufficient to correct the deficiencies of the CSRTs).
153. See supra Part I.D (summarizing the judicial review scheme set up by the
REAL ID Act).
154. See infra Parts III.B.1-2, III.C.1 (noting the similar deficiencies in the earlier
proceedings of both systems and the inadequate level of review provided to the
courts of appeals, which does not permit the reviewing court to correct the
deficiencies of the earlier proceedings).
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Boumediene in examining the DTA: the procedures provided for in
the REAL ID Act do not provide a constitutionally sufficient
155
substitute for the writ.
B. Analysis of Hearings at the Administrative Level Indicates the
Need for Extensive Review in the Federal Courts
Applying the standards set forth in Boumediene, the analysis begins
with the initial proceedings before both an IJ and the BIA. These
156
hearings present numerous issues similar to those of the CSRTs and
157
Both federal
create reason to question resulting removal orders.
judges and commentators have criticized the immigration courts in
recent years, not only for their procedures, but also for their
158
determinations. As one circuit court judge stated, “the adjudication
of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below the
159
minimum standards of legal justice.”
1. Hearings before an immigration judge demonstrate deficiencies in removal
orders
Hearings before immigration judges present issues similar to those
160
and thus create
the Court found troublesome in Boumediene
161
concern about the accuracy of the resulting removal order.
This
concern is only more urgent considering that the consequence of
such errors—expulsion from this country and the possible threat of
persecution, torture, and other mistreatment in one’s native
155. See Pfenning, supra note 38, at 735-36 (finding that the substitution of direct
review in the circuit courts in the REAL ID Act has not provided an “adequate and
effective” substitute for the writ because aliens do not have a right to introduce new
evidence in the courts of appeals); cf. Neuman, supra note 71, at 157 (arguing that
the complete removal of habeas review where direct review to the courts of appeals
does not afford an “adequate and effective” substitute for the writ poses serious
problems for courts in upholding the Act).
156. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (describing the “risk of error”
present in the CSRTs determinations).
157. See, e.g., Recinos de Leon v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005)
(noting that the “incomprehensible” opinion of an immigration judge resulted in
the reviewing court’s inability to determine the IJ’s factual or legal determinations).
158. See generally Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at A1 (reporting on the various criticisms circuit court
judges have lobbied on the immigration courts, in addition to the procedural
changes that have occurred in recent years at the BIA).
159. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005).
160. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2270 (2008) (noting the “considerable
risk of error” in the CSRTs’ factual findings).
161. Cf. Enwonwu v. Chertoff, 376 F. Supp. 2d 42, 85 (D. Mass. 2005) (disagreeing
with the BIA’s removal order and recommending that the circuit court remand the
case to the BIA, who had ordered Enwonwu’s removal, to reconsider all the
evidence, and, if the BIA still reinstated the removal order, suggesting to the circuit
court that his removal should be enjoined).
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country —is equally as serious as in Boumediene. Admittedly, there
are some issues present in the CSRTs not found in the hearings
164
However, the hearings on alien
concerning alien removal orders.
removal orders are more analogous to the CSRT hearings than
165
detentions resulting from a state court proceeding.
Both the
CSRTs and the immigration hearings are conducted within the
executive branch. Additionally, in his opinion in Boumediene, Justice
Kennedy expressed concern over various aspects of the CSRT
hearings that limited a detainee’s ability to contest the government’s
166
“assertion that he is an enemy combatant.” In hearings before IJs,
an alien’s ability to contest his or her removability is similarly
hindered. First, as Kennedy criticized the CSRT hearings due to the
167
lack of “assistance of counsel,” aliens similarly do not have a right to
counsel. Hearings concerning alien removal orders are conducted as
civil hearings, and therefore, they do not provide a constitutional
168
right to counsel, whereas any individual detained due to a federal
169
or state court criminal conviction would have the right to counsel.
162. See, e.g., Elias v. Gonzales, 212 F. App’x 441, 443 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining
that the petitioner, a member of the Chaldean Christian minority group in Iraq, was
seeking withholding of his removal order based on his fear of being persecuted by
the Ba’ath Party); Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 136–37 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting
that the petitioner, a citizen of Ghana, was requesting withholding of removal after
fleeing her home where her father had made her a slave, based on the practices of
his cultural sect); Recinos de Leon v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1187-88 (9th Cir.
2005) (describing that the petitioner, who was from an indigenous region in
Guatemala, was seeking asylum after his family members were killed by guerrillas and
he was arrested by soldiers, interrogated, and beaten for hours).
163. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2270 (2008) (noting the risk that an
innocent person could be detained for an indefinite period of time).
164. See, e.g., Anthony F. Renzo, Making a Burlesque of the Constitution: Military
Trials of Civilians in the War Against Terrorism, 31 VT. L. REV. 447, 540 n.442 (2007)
(explaining that in the non-adversarial nature of CSRT hearings, because there is a
presumption that the government’s evidence is “accurate and genuine,” the burden
of proof on the government is only a “preponderance of the evidence,” and the
detainee has “no access to classified evidence”).
165. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 34, § 104.04(2)(a) (noting the difference in
habeas review for petitions involving immigration matters compared to that involving
criminal convictions, in which an individual’s detention has already been subjected
to judicial review in either state or federal proceedings).
166. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2238 (listing various aspects of the CSRT
procedure that caused concern, including: the “limited means to find or present
evidence to challenge the Government’s case”; the lack of counsel and resulting
inability to be “aware of the most critical allegations that the Government relied
upon to order his detention”; and the difficulty posed to the detainee in questioning
witnesses).
167. Id.
168. See Victoria Cook Capitaine, Life in Prison Without a Trial: Indefinite Detention of
Immigrants in the United States, 79 TEX. L. REV. 769, 771 n.12 (2001) (explaining that
immigrants have no right to counsel or a jury trial in their proceedings).
169. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963) (establishing that all
individuals facing a criminal prosecution have the right to counsel under the
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Consequently, numerous aliens proceed pro se because they do not
170
This creates additional issues,
have the means to pay for counsel.
171
particularly regarding a judge’s fact-finding, similar to the problems
172
the Court identified in Boumediene.
Second, hearings before IJs have received increasing criticism in
recent years, particularly from circuit court judges who review the
173
records from these hearings.
Specifically, criticism has been
174
directed at the treatment of those appearing before IJs. In Fiadjoe v.
175
Attorney General, the circuit court described the IJ’s tone as “hostile
and at times . . . extraordinarily abusive” when he addressed the alien
seeking asylum, several times reducing her to tears when questioning
176
her about her father’s sexual abuse. While the court of appeals in
177
Fiadjoe did find a basis to remand back to the BIA, not all aliens are
178
Ms. Fiadjoe’s experience before an IJ is hardly
as fortunate.
Sixth Amendment and, if they are unable to afford one, the State, through the
Fourteenth Amendment, must appoint one).
170. See Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah & Jon Yates, Judges Fumble Asylum Cases: Refugee
Was Sent Back to Sudan to Face Jail, Beatings, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24, 2006, at C1 (observing
that many aliens cannot afford attorneys and subsequently do not know that they
have a right to appeal to federal courts); see also Palmer, supra note 80, at 25 (noting
the difficulty that detained aliens face in locating a lawyer, much less affording one).
171. See Nina Bernstein, New York’s Immigration Courts Lurch Under a Growing
Burden, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at A1 (maintaining that “[a] judge’s fact-finding is
much harder without a lawyer to speak for those facing deportation, who are not
entitled to court-appointed counsel”).
172. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2270 (noting the “considerable risk of error” in
the CSRTs’ factual findings).
173. See, e.g., Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533-34 (7th Cir. 2005) (naming
“disturbing features” that the circuit court had seen in the cases handled at the
immigration court). This listed included: a “lack of familiarity with relevant foreign
cultures,” an “exaggerated notion of the availability, especially in poor nations, of
documentary evidence,” “[i]nsensitivity to the possibility of misunderstandings
caused by the use of translators of difficult languages,” “[i]nsensitivity to the difficulty
of basing a determination of credibility on the demeanor of a person from a culture
remote from American [sic],” and “reluctance to make clean determinations of
credibility.” Id.
174. See Liptak, supra note 158, at A1 (quoting criticism from a judge on the Third
Circuit that “[t]he tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the sarcasm of the I.J.
seem more appropriate to a court television show than a federal court proceeding”).
175. 411 F.3d 135 (3d Cir. 2005).
176. See id. at 154-55 (describing the “bullying nature” of the judge’s questions
concerning such sensitive subjects as sexual abuse and the murder of her fiancé by
her father). Ms. Fiadjoe, a member of the Ewe tribe in Ghana, was raised by her
father, a Trokosi priest, who enslaved his daughter when she was seven years old and
sexually abused her for numerous years pursuant to Trokosi rituals. Id. at 139.
177. See id. at 163 (finding a lack of substantial evidence in the record to support
the IJ’s and BIA’s holdings).
178. See, e.g., Dong v. Ashcroft, 139 F. App’x 325, 326 n.1, 327 (2d Cir. 2005)
(acknowledging that the IJ and BIA decisions were not “model[s] of clarity,” but still
denying the petition for review); cf. Fiadjoe, 411 F.3d at 163, 169 (Smith, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for engaging in a de novo review, which is “not
an approach we are permitted to take as an appellate court reviewing agency action,”
despite acknowledging Ms. Fiadjoe’s “tragic story”).
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unique; numerous reports in recent years have highlighted the
180
The extent of this
extremely troubling treatment of aliens by IJs.
criticism prompted Attorney General Gonzales to begin a review of
181
all immigration courts. In his memorandum to the IJs, the Attorney
General noted the “reports of immigration judges who fail to treat
aliens appearing before them with appropriate respect and
consideration” and that the conduct of some judges “can aptly be
182
described as intemperate or even abusive.”
183
Lastly, there is concern over the quality of decisions issued by IJs.
184
In Recinos de Leon v. Gonzales, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reviewed a “literally incomprehensible opinion by an
185
immigration judge.” Due to the lack of any “intelligible structure,”
179. See, e.g., Wang v. Att’y Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 267 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Time and
time again, [the Third Circuit has] cautioned immigration judges against making
intemperate or humiliating remarks during immigration proceedings. Three times
this year [the court has] had to admonish [IJs] who failed to treat the asylum
applicants in their court with the appropriate respect and consideration.”);
Reyes-Melendez v. INS, 342 F.3d 1001, 1007 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the
IJ abandoned her role as a neutral fact-finder when she “became aggressive and
offered a stream of non-judicious and snide commentary” during the hearing and
that her decision was “replete with sarcastic commentary and moral attacks”).
180. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 171, at A1 (describing one woman’s experience
testifying before an IJ about being forcibly sterilized in China, to which the judge
responded by “insist[ing] that she was lying, ridicul[ing] her story and, when she
would not recant, den[ying] her petition for asylum”); see also Ann M. Simmons,
Some Immigrants Meet Harsh Face of Justice: Complaints of Insensitive—Even Abusive—
Conduct by Some U.S. Immigration Judges Have Prompted a Broad Federal Review,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006, at A18 (reporting criticism by one circuit judge concerning
an IJ who “had failed to conduct herself as an impartial judge but rather as a
prosecutor anxious to pick holes in the petitioner’s story” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
181. Memorandum from Alberto Gonzalez, Attorney General, to Immigration
Judges (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/ag010906.pdf (noting his concern with the reports that had emerged concerning some
immigration judges and explaining that the Deputy Attorney General and Associate
Attorney General would be conducting a “comprehensive review” of the immigration
courts and the BIA that would examine both the “quality of work as well as the
manner in which it is performed”).
182. See id. (noting the importance of the IJs’ role since they are the “face of
American justice” to the aliens appearing before them and that, while not all will be
granted relief, they must “be treated with courtesy and respect”). As one court put it:
In a country built on the dreams and accomplishments of an immigrant
population, a particularly severe wound is inflicted on the principle that
anyone who appears in an American courtroom is treated with dignity and
respect when an immigration matter is not conducted in accord with the
best of our tradition of courtesy and fairness.
Wang, 423 F.3d at 268–69 (quoting Iliev v. INS, 127 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 1997)).
183. See Figueroa v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 487, 498 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding
“that large parts of the opinion are incoherent”); Salim v. Keisler, 254 F. App’x 610,
610 (9th Cir. 2007) (observing that “several ambiguities” in the IJ’s decision
“preclude proper review of [the] case”).
184. 400 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 2005).
185. Id. at 1187.
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the court of appeals could not identify any factual or legal findings
186
that the IJ had made. There is also a failure to ensure consistency
in the decisions made by different IJs, as evinced in the Miami
immigration court, where one judge grants asylum three percent of
the time, while another judge in the same court grants it seventy-five
187
percent of the time. The disparity between two judges in the same
court who hear similar claims suggests that errors are occurring in
188
the judges’ decisions to order removal.
These problems stem in part from the system itself, which has
become increasingly overburdened in recent years and has a
189
tremendous backlog of cases.
However, the source of these
problems does not change the risk of error, which presents—as the
190
Court similarly found in Boumediene —serious consequences for
those ordered removed: expulsion from the United States to another
country where they could face persecution, torture, or other

186. See id. at 1190 (providing numerous examples of the incomprehensibility of
the IJ’s decision, in addition to attaching the oral transcript of the IJ’s decision to its
own). For example, in one sentence, the IJ stated that he found the alien credible,
only to state in the next sentence that the “credibility issue brings many doubts have
arisen in that as to the actual happenings and that what will happen to him if he is to
be returned.” Id.
187. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Wide Disparities Found in Judging of Asylum Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A1 (describing the results of a study that found “vast
differences in the handling of claims with generally comparable factual
circumstances”).
188. See id. (quoting immigration lawyers who find that an alien’s likelihood of
winning is based on luck and that there is a risk that the current system will not
adequately provide a refuge for those aliens truly in need of one).
189. See id. (noting that “judges have difficult work, with huge dockets of cases that
must be decided speedily on the basis of scant or subjective information”); see also
Figueroa v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 487, 498 (9th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that the
incoherency of the IJ’s decision may be “due to antiquated recording equipment, an
exceptionally heavy caseload, or some other reason, [but regardless] the deficiencies
in the IJ’s opinion certainly have complicated [the court’s] review”); Bernstein,
supra note 171, at A7 (quoting a federal judge who could not “see how immigration
judges can be expected to make thorough and competent findings of fact and
conclusions of law under these circumstances” which are only further exacerbated by
the lack of counsel for those facing removal (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Additionally, one recent study surveyed the immigration judges and found they faced
a significant risk of secondary traumatic stress and burnout which could affect their
decisions. Stuart L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative Responses
from the National Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey,
23 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 57, 58-59 (2008). Another recent study documented the
numerous challenges that immigration courts face, including the politicization of the
selection of immigration judges, the limited number of law clerks, issues with
government attorneys, and the difficulties in ensuring accurate translations.
See Appleseed, Assembly Line Injustice: Blueprint to Reform America’s Immigration
Courts 8, 11, 16-18, 19-21 (2009), available at http://www.asserlaw.com/
articles/article_164.pdf.
190. See 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2238 (2008) (noting the risk that an innocent person
could be detained for an indefinite period of time).

1638

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1611

191

mistreatment.
Despite the risk of error resulting in serious
consequences for aliens inaccurately ordered removed, the
administrative appeal to the BIA does not provide aliens with
sufficient ability to address that risk.
2. Procedures at the Board of Immigration Appeals do not correct the
deficiencies of the earlier proceedings
Instead of addressing the issues presented by the IJ hearings, the
procedure and nature of appeals at the BIA further necessitate
192
The BIA has
extensive judicial review in the federal courts.
received similar criticism from the courts of appeals to that received
193
by the IJs concerning the quality of its opinions.
As further
evidence of the quality of BIA decisions, Judge Posner noted that his
194
court overturned BIA decisions forty percent of the time.
More significant, however, are the streamlining procedures that have
195
been implemented at the BIA in recent years. Instead of ensuring
that hearings at the administrative level provide adequate review of
aliens’ claims, especially in light of the increasing criticism of the IJs,
these procedures were concerned only with eliminating the backlog
196
of cases at the BIA. This attempt to streamline has resulted in what
many consider a failure of the BIA to adequately review IJ decisions
because the majority of cases can be reviewed by a single judge
197
without issuing an opinion.
As Judge Posner has noted, the BIA
“often affirm[s] either with no opinion or with a very short,
191. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (describing the types of situations
aliens may return to if ordered removed to their native country).
192. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 158, at A26 (describing the result of the
streamlining processes as lacking any “meaningful” review).
193. See Solomon Moore & Ann M. Simmons, Immigrant Pleas Crushing Federal
Appellate Courts, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 2005, at A1 (quoting a federal judge who
described a BIA decision as “nonsensical,” “an example of sloppy adjudication,” and
“contraven[ing] considerable precedent”); see also Kaur v. Mukasey, 270 F. App’x
505, 507 (9th Cir. 2008) (“It is impossible to tell from the BIA’s extremely cursory
opinion in this case the legal and factual grounds for its decision.”).
194. See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (further
remarking that the corresponding figure for civil cases during the same time period
in which the United States was an appellee was eighteen percent).
195. See supra Part I.E (discussing the various streamlining procedures
implemented by the Attorney General, including permitting single judges to review
almost all removal orders instead of requiring the traditional three-judge panel,
allowing judges to issue decisions without an accompanying opinion explaining their
decisions, and, most importantly, limiting the scope of the BIA’s review over factual
findings made by IJs).
196. See Palmer, supra note 80, at 17-18 (noting that, beginning in 1999, the DOJ
implemented various regulations to streamline the appeals process at the BIA in
response to the increase in the BIA’s backlog in the 1990s).
197. See id. (explaining that the streamlining created a real failure in reviewing
cases from IJs, particularly in checking factual findings).
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unhelpful, boilerplate opinion even when the immigration judge
198
ha[s] committed manifest errors of fact and logic.” Therefore, the
courts of appeals, instead of the BIA, provide the “first meaningful
199
review” over alien removal orders. In fact, all that the streamlining
procedures have produced is a shift, not elimination, of the backlog
200
of cases from the BIA to the courts of appeals.
Perhaps the most critical of the recent changes has been the
201
curtailment of the BIA’s review over IJs’ factual findings.
Considering the criticism of the factual findings in the immigration
202
courts, the BIA’s inability to review such decisions severely hinders
an alien’s ability to receive an accurate decision concerning his or her
203
Despite this elimination of
petition to halt removal proceedings.
substantive review at the BIA, several courts of appeals have upheld
the streamlining, finding that it does not violate an alien’s due
204
process rights.
Courts have acknowledged that aliens
“have understandable concerns about the streamlining process,
particularly in light of the congressional limitations of federal court
205
review.”
Regardless of whether the process is constitutionally
sufficient, Boumediene establishes that a due process analysis is never
sufficient in determining the level of review required by the
206
Suspension Clause.
The analysis of whether the BIA provides the
necessary review cannot end by establishing that the streamlining
198. Liptak, supra note 158, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Id. (quoting Judge Walker, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit).
200. See Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 849 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting
that “[a]lthough a stated goal of the new regulations is to eliminate the BIA’s
backlog, [the 9th Circuit observes] that the practical result may be to shift the
backlog directly to the courts of appeal”); Preston, supra note 187, at A14 (reporting
the surge in appeals to the circuit courts since the streamlining procedures were
implemented).
201. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (noting that the BIA must now defer
to the factual findings of the immigration judges).
202. See supra Part III.B.1 (describing the various problems present in the
immigration courts today).
203. Cf. Preston, supra note 187, at A14 (explaining that in a study of asylum cases
from 1998 through 2005, “[a]sylum applicants . . . received favorable appeals
decisions from the [BIA] in 43 percent of cases in 2001 . . .” but by 2005, after the
changes had taken places, “asylum seekers . . . won their appeals in 13 percent of
cases”).
204. See Falcon Carriche, 350 F.3d at 850 (stating that it joins the First, Fifth,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits in its holding that the streamlining does not violate
an alien’s due process). Courts of appeals have also ruled that they do not have
jurisdiction to review the decision to streamline in a particular case because it would
require reviewing the IJ’s decision on the merits, over which they clearly do not have
jurisdiction. Id.
205. Id.
206. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text (noting that the inquiry into
the sufficiency of judicial review cannot end with a due process analysis).
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measures survive a due process test. Especially considering that the
BIA’s review over an IJ’s factual findings has been limited and that
the BIA cannot engage in its own fact finding, streamlining has
hindered the ability of the BIA to correct any errors from the earlier
207
hearing.
Therefore, despite this administrative appeal, the BIA
does not alleviate the “risk of error,” which was most crucial to the
Court in Boumediene in finding the need for extensive judicial
208
review.
C. The REAL ID Act Does Not Provide Sufficient Review of
Alien Removal Orders Despite the Issues with the Earlier Proceedings
Under the second step in the analytical approach set forth in
Boumediene, which examines the reviewing court to determine if it can
209
correct the deficiencies of the earlier proceedings, the REAL ID Act
fails to provide an “adequate and effective” substitute for the writ.
In light of the significant risk of error present in both the CSRT
210
hearings and those before IJs and the BIA, the reviewing court
under the REAL ID Act should be held to a standard similar to that
which the Court required when examining the DTA and MCA’s
211
judicial review system.
Boumediene requires the reviewing court to
have the means to correct the errors likely to occur in the factual
findings of the CSRTs, including the ability to “assess the sufficiency
of the Government’s evidence” and to introduce new exculpatory
212
evidence into the record.
Under this standard, the REAL ID Act
also fails by not providing a means of judicial review to account for
213
the failures of the previous proceedings.
1. The scope of review under the REAL ID Act is too limited to ensure the
accuracy of removal orders
Under the REAL ID Act, review by the courts of appeals is limited
to examining the administrative records of the immigration hearings

207. See supra Part I.E (providing an overview of the BIA and streamlining process
and its effects).
208. See supra notes 120-123 and accompanying text (finding a need for extensive
judicial review in light of the risk of error in the CSRTs).
209. See supra Part II.B (describing the analytical approach set forth by the
Supreme Court in Boumediene).
210. See supra Part III.B.1-2 (examining the proceedings before both an IJ and the
BIA and finding several deficiencies, particularly a risk of error in removal orders).
211. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2270 (2008) (discussing the
standard of review necessary for the writ to function as an appropriate remedy).
212. Id.
213. See supra Part I.D (discussing the effects of the Real ID Act, including
changing the standard of review for habeas proceedings).
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and considering constitutional issues or questions of law.
This is
similar to the DTA’s limited review, which Kennedy found
215
insufficient based on the procedures at the CSRT hearings.
Therefore, just as the DTA’s limited review failed to provide sufficient
review of the CSRT hearings, the REAL ID Act has failed in
numerous cases to provide adequate review when considering the
216
problems existing at the administrative level.
a. The courts of appeals under the REAL ID Act have no ability to
review the factual findings of the earlier proceedings
In light of the similar risk of error in the earlier proceedings, the
courts of appeals should have the ability to review the factual findings
of the IJs and the BIA, in accordance with the Court’s requirement in
217
Boumediene. However, in interpreting the REAL ID Act, the courts
of appeals have made it clear that it is not their job to engage in
218
fact-finding; instead, they are generally deprived of jurisdiction
when the petition for review concerns disputes over the correctness
219
of an IJ’s fact-finding. In fact, one court stated that judicial review
is not intended to ensure an accurate decision but rather to consider
220
whether the BIA made an individualized determination.
This position conflicts with the Court’s emphasis in Boumediene that
221
judicial review should be focused on ensuring accuracy.
When considering the courts of appeals’ interpretation of their
214. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (noting that the courts of appeals
no longer have jurisdiction to review factual findings).
215. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2238.
216. See supra Part III.B.1-2 (summarizing the issues that have arisen in recent
years concerning hearings before IJs and the BIA for alien removal orders).
217. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2270.
218. See, e.g., Puri v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that it
is the agency’s responsibility to make factual findings and the court’s job to review
the administrative record).
219. See id. (finding that the courts of appeals only have jurisdiction over
“questions of law,” and the REAL ID Act provides an adequate substitute to the writ
by allowing review in the courts of appeals because the Suspension Clause does not
require an evidentiary hearing before an Article III court). This unequivocal
statement that the Suspension Clause does not require evidentiary hearings is
rebutted in Boumediene, where the Court held that evidentiary hearings will be
required in certain circumstances. See 128 S. Ct. at 2270 (maintaining that the court
reviewing CSRT determinations “must have the authority to admit and consider
relevant exculpatory evidence” (emphasis added)).
220. Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005). This due process
approach to determining the scope of habeas review was rejected by the majority in
Boumediene. See 128 S. Ct. at 2270 (“Even if we were to assume that the CSRTs satisfy
due process standards, it would not end our inquiry.”).
221. See id. at 2273 (objecting to the DTA, which it found to “disadvantage[] the
detainee by limiting the scope of collateral review to a record that may not be
accurate”).
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jurisdiction under the REAL ID Act, judicial review of alien removal
orders is not sufficiently extensive to correct factual errors made in
222
the earlier proceedings.
The inability of the courts of appeals to sufficiently review factual
findings is also evident when considering the level of judicial review
223
the district courts possessed prior to the REAL ID Act. The story of
224
Frank Enwonwu typifies this difference in review.
While the case
was before the district court, four days of evidentiary hearings were
held and the judge used factual findings from those hearings in his
225
advisory opinion recommending that Enwonwu not be removed.
However, the circuit court disregarded those findings and remanded
226
the case back to the BIA. The BIA, however, was unable to consider
the district court’s factual findings and again ordered Enwonwu’s
227
removal.
228
Mohamed v. Gonzales also began as a habeas petition to a district
court, but was transferred to the court of appeals upon passage of the
229
230
REAL ID Act. The district court still issued an advisory opinion,
in which it disagreed with the BIA decision affirming the removal
231
order.
The district court objected to the failure to provide the
petitioner with a competency hearing prior to the original hearing,
where the alien proceeded pro se, despite clear evidence of his
232
incompetency.
The court of appeals, however, affirmed the BIA’s
233
Despite the alien’s argument that the dismissal was
decision.
unconstitutional, the court of appeals held that the REAL ID Act did

222. See, e.g., Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 232 F. App’x 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2007) (engaging
only in a limited review of the BIA’s reinstatement of Enwonwu’s removal order by
finding that the BIA’s review of the facts was “reasonable”).
223. See supra Part I.B-C (summarizing the availability of judicial review prior to
the REAL ID Act).
224. See supra notes 10–28 and accompanying text (describing the story of Frank
Enwonwu as he tried to seek judicial review over his state-created danger claim after
serving as a government informant).
225. See Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2006) (taking testimony
not only from Enwonwu, but also from DEA agents who had worked with Enwonwu
when he served as an informant for the government).
226. See id. at 35 (finding that there was no basis for the “state-created danger”
claim).
227. See Enwonwu, 232 F. App’x at 15 (noting the inability of the BIA to consider
the district court’s factual findings because its review is limited to the administrative
record of the hearing before the IJ).
228. 477 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2007).
229. Id. at 524.
230. Mohamed v. TeBrake, 371 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (D. Minn. 2005).
231. See id. at 1047 (finding that the IJ abused his discretion).
232. Id. at 1048-49.
233. See Mohamed, 477 F.3d at 528 (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction
because there was no constitutional claim or question of law).
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234

not violate the Suspension Clause.
These examples demonstrate
the failure of the REAL ID Act to provide the level of judicial review
required by the Court in Boumediene due to the risk of error from the
235
earlier proceedings.
b. Petitioners are unable to present new exculpatory evidence to the courts
of appeals
In addition to their inability to review factual findings, the
reviewing courts under the REAL ID Act cannot introduce
236
exculpatory evidence that was not presented at the initial hearing,
which further limits their ability to correct the deficiencies of the
237
earlier proceedings.
Boumediene criticized the DTA for failing to
permit the introduction of exculpatory evidence, which the Court
found “constitutionally required” in light of the earlier
238
proceedings.
In the context of alien removal orders, considering
that many involve asylum claims based on a fear of persecution in
their native country, the need to evaluate the current situation in that
country is imperative to correctly determining a petitioner’s
239
qualification for relief.
Therefore, limiting review to a potentially
outdated administrative record cannot afford sufficient consideration
240
of the alien’s claim.
While an alien can request that the BIA reopen the case based on
newly available information, the decision to grant such a motion for
234. See id. at 525 (finding that the Suspension Clause was not violated because an
“adequate and effective” substitute for the writ was provided by the court, whose
jurisdictional grant over constitutional claims and questions of law was as broad as a
habeas petition).
235. See supra Part III.B.1-2 (describing the deficiencies of the earlier
proceedings).
236. See Veena Reddy, Judicial Review of Final Orders of Removal in the Wake of the
REAL ID Act, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 582 (2008) (noting the inability of circuit courts to
consider changed circumstances in the country where an alien is claiming
persecution); see also id. at 566 (noting the lack of “pre-trial discovery of evidence” in
immigration hearings that is atypical of the “American model of civil adjudication”).
237. See id. at 579-80 (describing the criticisms of immigration judges for “making
mistakes in reviewing evidence proffered by a petitioner,” but noting the inability of
circuit courts to review such mistakes).
238. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2272 (2008) (“[W]e see no way to
construe the statute to allow what is also constitutionally required in this context:
an opportunity for the detainee to present relevant exculpatory evidence that was
not made part of the record in the earlier proceedings.”).
239. See Reddy, supra note 236, at 582 (maintaining that a petitioner’s
qualification for relief from removal may have changed since the BIA issued its
decision but prior to review by a court of appeals).
240. See Pfenning, supra note 38, at 735-36 (arguing that the REAL ID Act
unconstitutionally suspends the writ by not providing an “adequate and effective”
substitute because the courts of appeals cannot admit new evidence); cf. Boumediene,
128 S. Ct. at 2273 (criticizing the DTA for disadvantaging the “detainee by limiting
the scope of collateral review to a record that may not be accurate or complete”).
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reconsideration is discretionary and unappealable, providing no
241
assurance that the information will be introduced. Additionally, as
one circuit court has admitted, the ability to request reconsideration
cannot be enough to satisfy the Suspension Clause because it does
242
not provide judicial review.
The detainees in Boumediene also had
243
the opportunity to request a second CSRT in light of new evidence;
Kennedy, however, found this an “insufficient replacement for the
factual review these detainees are entitled to receive through habeas
corpus,” particularly considering that the decision to grant a new
244
CSRT is discretionary and unchallengeable by the detainee.
Therefore, the ability to request reconsideration of a removal order
cannot cure the inability of the reviewing court to introduce new
245
evidence.
Despite this inability to review factual findings or admit new
evidence, the courts of appeals have unanimously found that the
REAL ID Act does not violate the Suspension Clause because the
courts have jurisdiction to review constitutional claims and questions
246
The courts have found such review sufficient, despite
of law.
247
interpreting “questions of law” narrowly.
While consideration of
such issues is necessary, Boumediene requires that judicial review
extend further to allow consideration of factual issues when there is a
248
serious risk of error in the initial determination, as exists with alien
249
removal orders.
2.

Strict time limits place further limits on review by the courts of appeals
In addition to limiting the scope of review, the REAL ID Act
maintains a very stringent thirty-day time limit for the filing of

241. Cf. Kirk L. Peterson, “Final” Orders of Deportation, Motions to Reopen and
Reconsider, and Tolling Under the Judicial Review Provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 439, 443 (1994) (noting that the only means to review
such determinations is under an “abuse of discretion” standard).
242. Kolkevich v. Att’y Gen., 501 F.3d 323, 333 (3d Cir. 2007).
243. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2273.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., Ruiz-Martinez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 102, 114 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding
that Congress had provided an “adequate and effective” substitute for the writ in the
REAL ID Act by allowing review by the courts of appeals). In this decision, the
Second Circuit joined the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in finding that the
Suspension Clause was not violated. Id.
247. See, e.g., Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 324–25 (2d Cir. 2006)
(clarifying that “questions of law” is not meant to encompass all legal questions).
248. See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text (describing the deficiencies in
the CSRT hearings that required extensive judicial review).
249. See supra Parts III.B.1-2 (illustrating the issues with the hearings before both
IJs and the BIA).
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250

petitions for review in the courts of appeals. While this time limit
existed prior to the REAL ID Act, an alien had the ability to file for a
251
Aliens face
writ of habeas corpus if the time limit was not met.
252
numerous hurdles in filing such petitions, notably the possibility
that aliens will not receive notice of the BIA’s removal order in a
253
254
Considering these
timely manner, as in Mr. Enwonwu’s case.
issues, the REAL ID Act’s time limit raises serious concerns that an
255
alien will be precluded from any review.
This preclusion of review was evident with certain aliens who had
been ordered removed but who had not yet filed a habeas petition
256
upon passage of the REAL ID Act. When petitioners had a habeas
petition pending in a district court upon passage of the Act, the
courts of appeals granted review, even if the transfer from the district
court occurred more than thirty days after the removal order was
257
entered. However, those aliens who had yet to file a habeas petition
were only given thirty days after the passage of the Act to file a
258
petition for review in the relevant court of appeals.
In one such
case, because the alien did not file a petition within thirty days, the
259
court of appeals denied his motion. He was, therefore, provided no
250. See Morawetz, supra note 53, at 126 (noting that the REAL ID Act maintained
the time limit from the 1996 legislation). See generally Neuman, supra note 71, at 142
(explaining the development of time limits for seeking review of removal orders, a
“recent development” that did not exist in any capacity prior to 1961 and gradually
has been reduced to its current thirty-day limit).
251. Cf. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 (2001) (holding that habeas review was
still available).
252. See Morawetz, supra note 53, at 126 (noting possible issues that could arise,
including: failure to receive a BIA decision, difficulties in filing while in detention,
or failure to file due to ineffective assistance of counsel).
253. Id.
254. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing how Enwonwu never
received notice that the dismissal of his removal order was being appealed).
255. See Morawetz, supra note 53, at 127 (explaining that how the courts choose to
interpret the date that the time limit begins to run will have implications for the
availability of judicial review).
256. See, e.g., Kolkevich v. Att’y Gen., 501 F.3d 323, 336 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing
the issues posed by this situation upon passage of the REAL ID Act).
257. See id. (noting that habeas petitions that were currently pending in the
district courts upon passage of the REAL ID Act could be transferred to the
appropriate court of appeals).
258. See id. (holding that the REAL ID Act allowed “the transfer from a district
court to a court of appeals not only of those habeas petitions that were pending in
the district court at the time [the Act] became law, but also those that could have
been brought in a district court prior to [the Act’s] enactment”). The court went on
to note that the time limit “should not be interpreted as applying to those aliens who
received final orders of removal prior to the enactment of [the Act], but who did not
file a petition for review directly in a court of appeals until after the enactment of
[the Act].” Id.
259. Id. at 337 (dismissing the petition for review because the filing of it was well
past the thirty-day limit that started when the REAL ID Act was enacted).
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judicial review of his administrative hearing, regardless of his right to
260
The court
such review in a federal district court prior to the Act.
261
argued that he was put on notice as soon as the Act was passed, but
262
considering he had no counsel, such notice is insufficient.
Some circuits have taken an even harsher approach by not even
providing thirty days from the Act’s passage to petition for review for
263
those aliens who had yet to file a habeas petition prior to the Act.
Concerns also develop with this stringent time limit when the
264
failure to comply is due to ineffective assistance of counsel. In one
case, an alien ordered removed filed a motion with the BIA to reopen
his case because his previous counsel had failed to file an appellate
265
brief with the BIA and his time limit subsequently ran out. The BIA
denied the motion to reopen and the alien subsequently appealed to
the court of appeals, arguing the REAL ID Act did not provide an
266
“adequate and effective” substitute for the writ due to its time limit.
While the court acknowledged that the time limit was considerably
267
shorter than the one-year time limit under AEDPA, it upheld the
REAL ID Act and found that it did not have jurisdiction to review the
268
BIA’s decision on the alien’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
While it is reasonable to impose some time limit on the ability to
seek review in the federal courts, any time limit must be examined to
ensure that it does not effectively preclude an individual’s right to
269
“adequate and effective” judicial review. The continuing reduction
in the time limit for seeking review of alien removal orders has
reached the point where the ability to seek review could, in some
270
circumstances, become an “illusion.”
While this specific issue did
260. Id.
261. Id. at 337 n.9.
262. Cf. Morawetz, supra note 53, at 127-28 (describing the ability of the court to
issue removal orders in absentia so long as notice has been sent out, yet stressing that
this procedure can present the “most frightening exercise of government power”
because there is no way to ensure that the alien received notice, and he or she will
consequently have no way to contest removal).
263. See Peguero-Cruz v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 358, 361 (1st Cir. 2007) (refusing to
commence the thirty-day time line from the date of the Act’s passage and finding
that the petition was untimely since it was not filed within thirty days of the BIA’s
decision).
264. See Morawetz, supra note 53, at 126 (presenting the possibility that counsel
may fail to file a timely appeal).
265. Ruiz-Martinez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2008).
266. Id. at 108.
267. Id. at 115.
268. Id. at 117.
269. Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2266 (2008) (requiring a substitute
for the writ to provide a “meaningful opportunity to demonstrate” the “erroneous
application or interpretation” of the law which resulted in a detention).
270. Neuman, supra note 71, at 142.
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not arise in Boumediene, the analytical framework developed in the
case indicates that the REAL ID Act does not provide an “adequate
and effective” substitute for the writ due to the preclusive nature of
271
the thirty-day time limit.
Any court reviewing removal orders must have an extensive scope
272
of review due to the risk of error in the administrative hearings.
However, the REAL ID Act, particularly as interpreted by the circuit
courts, cannot be upheld as a sufficient substitute for the writ under
Boumediene’s analysis in light of the circuit courts’ limited scope of
review and the stringent time limit on seeking review.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS IN LIGHT OF THE
CURRENT INADEQUATE REVIEW OF ALIEN REMOVAL ORDERS
AVAILABLE UNDER THE REAL ID ACT
Because the REAL ID Act has not created an “adequate and
effective” substitute for the writ based on Boumediene’s test, the Act
violates the Suspension Clause by stripping aliens of the right to seek
habeas review and not providing a constitutionally sufficient
substitute. Congress and the courts, therefore, should reexamine the
current judicial review scheme in order to provide the level of review
required by the Constitution.
A. A Saving Construction of the REAL ID Act Cannot Alleviate
the Insufficient Review
While the courts of appeals could attempt to use a saving
construction of the REAL ID Act either to allow habeas review or to
expand the scope of review currently employed by the courts of
appeals, neither approach will alleviate the Suspension Clause
concerns.
First, based on both the language of the REAL ID Act and its
legislative history, it appears impossible to interpret the Act in a way
that would permit habeas review, as the Court in St. Cyr was able to
273
do. The Court in St. Cyr made clear that in order to find a repeal of
habeas review, Congress would have to provide a “clear,
274
unambiguous, and express statement” of that intent,
which
271. See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text (summarizing the Court’s
findings in Boumediene concerning the deficiencies in the CSRTs, which the Court
held required extensive judicial review).
272. Cf. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2270 (concluding that even when all parties to a
proceeding act in good faith there is still a considerable risk of error in fact-finding).
273. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315 (2001) (finding that Congress did not
explicitly dictate its intent to repeal habeas review).
274. Id.
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Congress has done in the REAL ID Act. The language of the Act
establishes that review in the courts of appeals will be the “sole and
275
exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal.”
Congress also clarified its intent to eliminate habeas review through
276
its Conference Report for the Act.
Therefore, any attempt by the
courts to read the Act as allowing habeas review would be contrary to
congressional intent.
Additionally, any attempt by the courts to read broadly the scope of
review granted in the Act would still not satisfy the Suspension Clause
under the Court’s analysis in Boumediene. Under the Boumediene
analysis, it was essential for the court reviewing the CSRTs to have the
ability to correct the deficiencies of the earlier proceedings,
277
particularly any errors in fact-finding.
Because there is a similar
278
concern regarding the accuracy of alien removal orders, any
extension in the scope of the circuit courts’ review would not address
that concern due to the courts of appeals’ inability to consider new
279
evidence and make factual findings.
B. Habeas Review Should Be Restored to Provide a Safeguard
When Direct Review Proves Inadequate or Ineffective
Since it is not possible to construe the REAL ID Act in a manner
that would comport with the Suspension Clause, Congress must
restore some form of habeas review or the courts should find the Act
in violation of the Suspension Clause. As mentioned in Boumediene,
Congress could satisfy the Suspension Clause by inserting a savings
clause that would permit habeas review in the district courts if the

275. Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(a)(1)(B), 119 Stat. 231 (2005) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
276. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 173-74 (2005) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 298-99 (noting, first, that the intent of the 1996 acts was to
eliminate habeas review, which the Court disregarded in its St. Cyr decision; second,
that the system created by the St. Cyr decision has created anomalies and confusion;
and third, section 106 of the REAL ID Act solves the problems created in St. Cyr
because it eliminates the bifurcated system of review in both the district courts and
courts of appeals by only permitting review in the circuit courts).
277. See supra Part II.B-C (observing that “adequate and effective” review must
include the ability to correct the deficiencies of the earlier proceedings, which the
DTA did not permit because the court of appeals could not make factual findings).
278. See supra Part III.B.1-2 (describing the deficiencies of the hearings before IJs
and the BIA).
279. See James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas
Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2007–08 (1992) (commenting
that an essential aspect of review under a petition for habeas corpus is the ability of
the district courts to “hear evidence themselves,” whereas the courts of appeals or the
Supreme Court hearing claims on direct appeal must remand to either the
administrative courts or the state courts for additional evidence to be gathered).
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review in the courts of appeals proved inadequate or ineffective.
This approach would largely restore judicial review of alien removal
orders to the system established by the 1961 amendments to the INA,
281
which existed until 1996. Under the 1961 system, while the courts
of appeals would have primary jurisdiction to review removal orders,
habeas review would be preserved for unusual cases where direct
282
review proved inadequate or ineffective.
In this way, direct review
could still be used for those cases where the circuit courts have
adequate jurisdiction to correct any deficiencies from the earlier
283
proceedings. A savings clause would, however, preserve the right to
judicial review for those individuals for whom direct review is not
284
sufficient.
If direct review is preserved as the primary means of judicial review,
Congress would need to alter the time limit on filing for review in the
courts of appeals. In the 1961 amendments, most aliens had ninety
285
days to file for review, compared to the thirty days allowed under
286
Such a stringent time limit can preclude all
the REAL ID Act.
287
review and, therefore, cannot satisfy Boumediene’s test for “adequate
and effective” review when habeas review is limited to unusual
circumstances.
While it might appear difficult to create an “adequate and
effective” substitute for the writ after Boumediene, this limited ability to
suspend the writ would be consistent with the history of the writ in

280. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text (noting that even in the state
court conviction context, both statutes maintained a savings clause to permit habeas
review).
281. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (explaining the previous system
of review, which provided for primary jurisdiction to reside with the courts of appeals
but permitted habeas review in unusual circumstances or when an alien was subject
to removal and simultaneously detained).
282. See Morawetz, supra note 53, at 117 (describing habeas review as a
“backstop”).
283. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing the Fiadjoe case, in
which the circuit court had sufficient jurisdiction to address the deficiencies from the
earlier proceedings).
284. See, e.g., Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 232 F. App’x 11, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2007)
(revealing the failings of direct review and exemplifying a situation in which judicial
review is necessary to correct the BIA’s erroneous conclusion).
285. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (describing the provisions of the
1961 INA).
286. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (acknowledging the time limits
imposed by the REAL ID Act, which maintained those previously established in the
1996 acts).
287. See supra note 270 and accompanying text (explaining that the reduction in
the time allowed to petition for review can be reduced to the point where judicial
review is an “illusion”).
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288

the United States. As the Court in Boumediene stressed, the writ of
habeas corpus has not been suspended often in this country’s history,
indicating the “care Congress has taken . . . to preserve the writ and
289
its function.”
The drafters of the Suspension Clause also
considered the writ to have a “pre-eminent role” in the United States’
290
constitutional system, and only permitted its suspension in two
291
limited circumstances. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the
ability of Congress to suspend the writ so long as an “adequate and
292
effective” substitute is provided. Boumediene makes clear for the first
time the stringent nature of the test for determining an “adequate
and effective” substitute, ensuring that the suspension of the
293
“Great Writ” will not occur with any frequency.
CONCLUSION
For the first time, Boumediene v. Bush established a test for
determining whether a substitute for the writ of habeas corpus is
“adequate and effective” for the purpose of upholding the
Suspension Clause. In order to establish the constitutionality of a
substitute, earlier proceedings must first be examined for any
deficiencies that create cause for concern in the resulting
determination. Upon determining the existence of any deficiencies,
the reviewing court’s authority must then be examined to determine
if it can properly address the deficiencies from the earlier
proceedings.
Applying this test to the current system of review for alien removal
orders, the elimination of the right to habeas review under the REAL
ID Act violates the Suspension Clause. When considering the
procedures both at the immigration courts and the BIA, in addition
to the issues concerning the conduct of those cases, there is cause for
concern regarding the accuracy of the removal orders, as the Court
similarly found in Boumediene with the CSRTs. In light of this
concern, the courts of appeals’ permitted level of review over the IJs
288. See supra Part I.A (noting the importance placed on the writ throughout the
history of the United States).
289. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2263 (2008) (finding that most
legislative acts concerning the writ have actually expanded its scope rather than
suspended it).
290. GORDON ET AL., supra note 34, § 104.04(2)(a).
291. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (permitting the writ to be suspended in the
event of a “[r]ebellion or [i]nvasion”).
292. E.g. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977); United States v. Hayman, 342
U.S. 205, 223 (1952).
293. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004) (noting that the writ of
habeas corpus is also called the “Great Writ”).
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and BIA’s decisions does not provide sufficiently extensive review,
particularly due to the limited jurisdictional grant and the stringent
time limit for filing for review. Because the courts of appeals would
be unable to conduct evidentiary hearings and make factual findings,
it is unlikely that even the broadest possible grant to the courts of
appeals would satisfy the Suspension Clause. Instead, the surest way
of providing constitutionally adequate review would be to restore
aliens’ right to seek habeas review in the federal district courts.
While direct review to the courts of appeal can be maintained as the
primary means of judicial review for removal orders, habeas review
must be reinstated as a safeguard for those unique cases, such as
Frank Enwonwu’s, for whom direct review proves inadequate and
ineffective.
Boumediene has refocused the use of the writ to providing
protections that go beyond assurances of fair procedure, as the
legislative changes in recent years concerning alien removal orders
have erred in doing. The writ must be administered in a way that will
reach and correct injustices that have occurred. Stories such as Frank
Enwonwu’s demonstrate the grave risks presented when Congress
and the courts fail to apply the writ to its fullest capacity.
The implications of Boumediene do not end here, however, but rather
reach to all uses of the writ. The impact on alien removal orders is,
unfortunately, but one example of the curtailment of habeas
protections in recent years.

